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Abstract
Power lines, roadways, pipelines and other physical infrastructure are critical to modern society. These
structures may be viewed as spatial networks where geographic distances play a role in the functionality
and construction cost of links. Traditionally, studies of network robustness have primarily considered the
connectedness of large, random networks. Yet for spatial infrastructure physical distances must also play a
role in network robustness. Understanding the robustness of small spatial networks is particularly important
with the increasing interest in microgrids, small-area distributed power grids that are well suited to using
renewable energy resources. We study the random failures of links in small networks where functionality
depends on both spatial distance and topological connectedness. By introducing a percolation model where
the failure of each link is proportional to its spatial length, we find that, when failures depend on spatial
distances, networks are more fragile than expected. Accounting for spatial effects in both construction and
robustness is important for designing efficient microgrids and other network infrastructure.
∗ Thomas.McAndrew@uvm.edu; www.uvm.edu/˜tmcandre/
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I. INTRODUCTION
The field of complex networks has grown in recent years with applications across many scien-
tific and engineering disciplines [1–3]. Network science has generally focused on how topological
characteristics of a network affect its structure or performance [1–6]. Unlike purely topological
networks, spatial networks [7] like roadways, pipelines, and the power grid must take physical dis-
tance into consideration. Topology offers indicators of the network state, but ignoring the spatial
component may neglect a large part of how the network functions [8–11]. For spatial networks in
particular, links of different lengths may have different costs affecting their navigability [12–17]
and construction [18–21].
Percolation [22] provides a theoretical framework to study how robust networks are to fail-
ure [4, 23–26]. In traditional bond percolation, each link in the network is independently removed
with a constant probability, and it is asked whether or not the network became disconnected. The-
oretical studies of percolation generally assume very large networks that are locally treelike, often
requiring millions of nodes before finite-size effects are negligible. Yet many physical networks
are far from this size; even large power grids may contain only a few thousand elements.
There is a need to study the robustness of small spatial networks. Microgrids [27–30] are one
example. Microgrids are small-area (30–50 km), standalone power grids that have been proposed
as a new model for towns and residential neighborhoods in light of the increased penetration of
renewable energy sources. Creating small robust networks that are cost-effective will enable easier
introduction of the microgrid philosophy to the residential community. Due to their much smaller
geographic extent, an entire microgrid can be severely affected by a single powerful storm, such
as a blizzard or hurricane, something that is unlikely to happen to a single, continent-wide power
grid. Thus building on previous work, we consider how robustness will be affected by spatial and
financial constraints. The goal is to create model networks that are both cost-effective, small in
size, and at the same time to understand how robust these small networks are to failures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II a previous model of spatial networks
is summarized. Section III contains a brief summary of percolation on networks, and applies
these predictions to the spatial networks. In Sec. IV we introduce and study a new model of
percolation for spatial networks as an important tool for infrastructure robustness. Section V
contains a discussion of these results and future work.
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II. MODELING INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKS
In this work we consider a spatial network model introduced by Gastner & Newman [19, 20],
summarized as follows. A network consists of |V | = N nodes represented as points distributed
uniformly at random within the unit square. Links are then placed between these nodes according
to associated construction costs and travel distances. The construction cost is the total Euclidean
length of all edges in the network,
∑
(i, j)∈E di j, where di j is the Euclidean distance between nodes
i and j and E is the set of undirected links in the network. This sum represents the capital outlay
required to build and maintain the network. When building the network, the construction cost must
be under a specified budget. Meanwhile, the travel distance encapsulates how easy it is on average
to navigate the network and serves as an idealized proxy for the functionality of the network. The
degree to which spatial distance influences this functionality is tuned by a parameter λ via an
“effective” distance
deff(i, j) =
√
Nλdi j + (1 − λ).
Tuning λ toward 1 represents networks where the cost of moving along a link is strongly spatial
(for example, a road network) while choosing λ closer to 0 leads to more non-spatial networks
(for example, air transportation where the convenience of traveling a route depends more on the
number of hops or legs than on the total spatial distance). To illustrate the effect of λ, we draw two
example networks in Fig. 1. Finally, the travel distance is defined as the mean shortest effective
path length between all pairs of nodes in the network. Taken together, we seek to build networks
that minimize travel distance while remaining under a fixed construction budget, i.e. given fixed
node positions, links are added according to the constrained optimization problem
min
1(
N
2
) ∑
s,t∈V
∑
(u,v)∈Π(s,t)
deff(u, v)
subject to
∑
(i, j)∈E
di j ≤ Budget,
(1)
where Π(s, t) is the set of links in the shortest effective path between nodes s and t, according to
the effective distances deff . This optimization was solved using simulated annealing (see App. A
for details) with a budget of 10 (as in [19, 20]) and a size of N = 50 nodes. We focus on such a
small number of nodes to better mimic realistic microgrid scales. In this work, to average results,
100 individual network realizations were constructed for each λ.
An important quantity to understand in these networks is the distribution of Euclidean link
lengths. If edges were placed randomly between pairs of nodes, the lengths would follow the
3
λ = 0 λ = 1
FIG. 1. (Color online) Two optimized spatial networks with the same node coordinates illustrate how
λ influences network topology. The non-spatial case λ = 0 shows long-range hubs due to the lack of
restriction on edge distance; the spatial case λ = 1 lacks expensive long distance links leading to a more
geometric graph. As examples, the non-spatial case may correspond to air travel where minimizing the
number of flights a traveler takes on a journey is more important than minimizing the total distance flown,
while the spatial case may represent a road network where the overall travel distance is more important than
the number of roads taken to reach a destination.
square line picking distribution with mean distance 〈d〉 ≈ 0.52141 [31]. Instead, the optimized
network construction makes long links costly and we observe (Fig. 2) that the probability distribu-
tion P(d) of Euclidean link length d after optimization is well explained by a gamma distribution,
meaning the probability that a randomly chosen edge has length d is
P(d) =
1
Γ(κ)θκ
dκ−1e−d/θ, (2)
with shape and scale parameters κ > 0 and θ > 0, respectively. A gamma distribution is plausible
for the distribution of link lengths because it consists of two terms, a power law and an exponential
cutoff. This product contains the antagonism between the minimization and the constraint in
Eq. (1): Since longer links are generally desirable for reducing the travel distance, a power law
term with positive exponent is reasonable, while the exponential cutoff captures the need to keep
links short to satisfy the construction budget and the fact that these nodes are bounded by the unit
square. See Fig. 2.
The network parameters were chosen under conditions that were general enough to apply to
any small network, for instance a microgrid in a small residential neighborhood. The choices of
50 nodes and a budget of 10 were also made in line with previous studies of this network model
to balance small network size with a budget that shows the competition between travel distance
minimization and construction cost constraint [19, 20].
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FIG. 2. (Color online) The distributions of Euclidean link lengths di j between nodes i and j are well
explained for all λ by gamma distributions, i.e. P(di j) ∝ dκ−1i j e−di j/θ. (A) Maximum likelihood estimates of
P(di j) for multiple λ. Two distributions are shifted vertically for clarity. (B) The gamma parameters κ, θ as
a function of λ. Quadratic fits provide a guide for the eye.
III. ROBUSTNESS OF PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Percolation theory on networks studies how networks fall apart as they are sampled. For ex-
ample, in traditional bond percolation each link in the network is independently retained with
probability p (equivalently, each link is deleted with probability q = 1 − p). This process repre-
sents random errors in the network. The percolation threshold qc is the value of q where the giant
component, the connected component containing the majority of nodes, first appears. Infinite sys-
tems exhibit a phase transition at qc, which becomes a critical point [22]. In this work we focus
on small micronetworks, a regime under-explored in percolation theory and far from the thermo-
dynamic limit invoked by most analyses. In our finite graphs, we estimate qc as the value of q that
corresponds to the largest S 2, where S n is the fraction of nodes in the nth largest connected com-
ponent (Fig. 3). In finite systems the second largest component peaks at the percolation threshold;
for q > qc the network is highly disconnected and all components are small, while for q < qc a
giant component almost surely encompasses most nodes and S 2 is forced to be small. Note that it
is also common to measure the average component size excluding the giant component [22, 32].
For the case of uniformly random link removals (bond percolation) it was shown that the critical
point occurs when q is such that 〈k2〉/ 〈k〉 = 2 [33, 34], where 〈k〉 and 〈k2〉 are the first and second
moments of the percolated graph’s degree distribution, respectively. We denote this theoretical
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FIG. 3. The fractions of nodes in the first and second largest components, S 1 and S 2, respectively, as a
function of link deletion probability q. In finite systems the percolation threshold qc can be estimated from
the maximum of S 2 (dashed line). This example used optimized networks with λ = 1/2.
threshold as q˜c to distinguish this value from the qc estimated via S 2. Computing this theoretical
prediction for the optimized networks (Sec. II) we found q˜c between 0.66 and 0.71 for the full
range of λ (Fig. 4). It is important to note that the derivation of this condition for q˜c makes two
related assumptions that are a poor fit for these optimized spatial networks. First, the theoretical
model studies networks whose nodes are connected at random. This assumption does not hold
for the constrained optimization (Eq. (1)) we study. Second, this calculation neglects loops by
assuming the network is very large and at least locally treelike. For the small, optimized networks
we build this is certainly not the case. These predictions for the critical point q˜c do provide a useful
baseline to compare to the empirical estimates of qc via S 2.
IV. MODELING INFRASTRUCTURE ROBUSTNESS
The work by Gastner and Newman [20] showed the importance of incorporating spatial dis-
tances into the construction of an infrastructure network model. With physical infrastructure we
argue that it is important to also consider spatial distances when estimating how robust a network
is to random failures. For example, consider a series of power lines built in a rural area where trees
are scattered at random. In a storm trees may fall and damage these lines, and one would expect,
all else being equal, that one line built twice as long as another would have twice the chance of a
tree falling on it and thus failing.
Motivated by this example, an intuitive model for how links fail would require an increasing
6
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FIG. 4. For an infinite, uncorrelated network, percolation occurs at the sampling probability for which〈
k2
〉
/ 〈k〉 = 2 [33]. We computed this predicted critical point q˜c for each λ finding q˜c between 0.66–0.72.
The quadratic fit provides a guide for the eye.
chance of failure with length. The simplest model supposes that the failure of a link is directly
proportional to length, i.e., that each unit length is equally likely to fail. With this in mind we now
introduce the following generalization of bond percolation: Each link (i, j) independently fails
with probability min
(
1,Qi j
)
, where
Qi j = qM
dαi j∑
(i, j)∈E dαi j
= q
dαi j
〈dα〉 , (3)
q ∈ [0, 1] is a tunable parameter that determines how many edges from 0 to |E| = M will fail
on average, and the parameter α controls how distance affects failure probability. We naturally
recover traditional bond percolation (Qi j = q) when α = 0 and α = 1 corresponds to the case of
constant probability per unit length. See Fig. 5 for example networks illustrating how Qi j depends
on di j and α.
Given the gamma distribution of link lengths, the distribution of dα is (when α > 0)
P(dα) =
1
αΓ(κ)θκ
dκ/α−1 exp
(
−d
1/α
θ
)
(4)
with mean
〈dα〉 = 1
αΓ(κ)θκ
∫ ∞
0
yκ/αe−y
1
α /θ dy = θα
Γ(κ + α)
Γ(κ)
. (5)
When α = 1, the above distribution (4) will reduce to the original distribution P(d), Eq. (2).
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FIG. 5. (Color online) A non-spatial (λ = 0) and spatial (λ = 1) network with multiple values of α showing
how to tune the role spatial distance plays in percolation. Here the width and color of a given edge (i, j)
are proportional to failure probability Qi j ∼ dαi j (3) and node size corresponds to the number of effective
shortest paths through nodes, with the same scales used across all network diagrams. Increasing α leads to
failure probability becoming more concentrated on the links connected to a small number of hubs, with the
effected hubs being more central (in terms of shortest paths) for the non-spatial network (λ = 0) than for the
more geometric network.
With the above failure model and the distribution P(d), we may express the probability P(Qi j)
that a randomly chosen edge (i, j) has failure probability Qi j as
P(Qi j) =
1
αΓ(κ)θκ
(〈dα〉
q
)κ/α
Q
κ
α−1
i j exp
−1θ
(〈dα〉
q
Qi j
) 1
α
 . (6)
This distribution has mean
〈
Qi j
〉
= q. (However, the true mean failure probability is 〈min(1,Q)〉 ≤
〈Q〉 which leads to a small correction, easily computed, as q gets closer to 1.) Note that, while
the mean does not rely on the distances of edges, α (and 〈dα〉) do play a role in higher moments.
For example, the variance of Q is σ2(Q) = q2 (B(α, κ)/B(α, α + κ) − 1), where B(x, y) is the Beta
function.
To study this robustness model we percolate the infrastructure networks by stochastically re-
moving links (i, j) with probabilities Qi j (Eq. (3)) for 0 < q < 1 and 0 < α < 4. In Fig. 6 we
plot S 2 vs. q for various combinations of α and λ. Importantly, in all cases qc < q˜c, indicating that
these networks are less robust than predicted. When comparing the effects of each parameter, α
has a much greater effect in reducing qc than λ; sampling by distance plays a much greater role in
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FIG. 6. (Color online) In each panel, S 2 (fraction of nodes in the 2nd largest component) curves are shown
with the range of the theoretical threshold q˜c shown in gray. Higher values of α make failures depend more
strongly on distance, while changing λ adjusts a network’s form from non-spatial (small λ) to spatial (large
λ). (Top row) Regardless of λ, larger values of α tend to shift the peak of S 2 towards lower q, leading
to less robust networks. (Bottom row) Different values of λ for a given α lead to shifted S 2 profiles, but
the shift is less prominent. Regardless of the parameters, spatial networks are more fragile than predicted
from theory [33, 35]. While both parameters influence the robustness of these spatial networks, α plays a
stronger role than λ. Note that with our definition of Q (3), S 2 may remain finite as q→ 1.
determining robustness than how the network is constructed.
The curves in Fig. 6 show S 2 for the entire range of q; to study qc requires examining the
peaks of these curves. Figure 7 systematically summarizes qc as a function of λ and α. Over
all parameters, qc ranges from approximately 0.30 to 0.50. Globally, the most vulnerable region
is at A ((λ, α) ≈ (0, 2)); these non-spatial networks with strong, super-linear (α > 1) failure
dependence on distance occupy the most vulnerable region of (Fig. 7) since their construction
(low distance dependence) is in direct opposition to how links fail (high distance dependence).
Even when networks are built with the goal of minimizing physical distances along links (high λ),
the exponent α still lowers qc compared with the theoretical prediction (highlighted at region B).
Almost any introduction of spatial dependence on link failure (compare α > 0 with α = 0) leads
to less robust networks.
Finally, to better understand why these infrastructure networks are less robust than the theo-
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Critical failure probability qc as a function of α and λ. Overall, values of α > 0
always correspond to lower robustness than when α = 0 and in particular, the percolation threshold, qc, is
lowest near A ((λ, α) ≈ (0, 2)), while networks are generally most robust when α ≤ 0.5. The exponent α
lowers qc even in geometric networks (high λ) where spatial distance plays a stronger role in the network
topology (region B). This matrix was smoothed with a σ = 5-pixel gaussian convolution for clarity.
retical prediction [33, 35], we studied correlations in network structure by computing the mean
degree of nearest neighbors 〈knn〉 = ∑k′ P(k′ | k) [36] and the mean distance to nearest neighbors
〈dnn〉 =
∫
d′P(d′ | k) dd′, both as functions of node degree k. Here P(k′|k) is the conditional proba-
bility that a node of degree k has a neighbor of degree k′ and P(d′|k) is the conditional probability
that a node of degree k has a link of length between d′ and d′ + dd′. See Fig. 8. Due to the opti-
mization (Eq. 1), both 〈dnn〉 and 〈knn〉 indicate non-random structure, since they depend on k. Even
for the case λ = 1, which shows no relationship between 〈dnn〉 and k, there is a positive trend for
〈knn〉. Therefore, the optimized networks always possess correlated topologies.
Taken together, Fig. 8 shows that, beyond finite-size effects, q˜c overestimates qc because (i)
these networks are non-random and (ii) higher degree nodes tend to have longer links leading to
hubs that suffer more damage when α > 0. Since hubs play an outsized role in holding the network
together, the positive correlation between d and k causes spatial networks to more easily fall apart,
lowering their robustness.
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Degree and distance correlations in optimized spatial networks. Here 〈knn〉 is the
mean degree of nearest neighbors and 〈dnn〉 is the mean distance of nearest neighbors. We observe that
〈knn〉 shows a negative trend with degree k for λ = 0, and positive trend for λ = 0.5 and 1.0. On the other
hand, 〈dnn〉 shows an increasing trend with k for decreasing λ. These optimized networks are not randomly
constructed; they possess correlations in either network or spatial structure (or both) for all λ. The above
metrics indicate that non-spatial networks form hubs whose longer links are likely to fail with higher prob-
ability and cause more damage to the network. Alternatively, more spatially-dependent networks (higher λ)
have 〈dnn〉 that depends less on k, indicating that link failures are spread somewhat more uniformly across
high- and low-degree nodes.
V. DISCUSSION
A potential application of this model is to designing microgrids. The microgrid concept, most
commonly implemented in military settings, has gained wider popularity with the advent of the
smart grid. Building a microgrid that is robust to failures while constrained by a budget is impor-
tant for the widespread adoption of microgrids. Furthermore, the model also brings to light the
need to keep in mind that the construction of convenient, long power lines may not be an optimal
choice when accounting for the system’s robustness. This may reinforce distributed generation
across many buildings, as opposed to the power grid (traditional utility) creation of power lines
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stemming from a centralized cluster of small power plants. A move toward distributed genera-
tion and the decommissioning of the traditional utility may raise the overall stability of the grid.
Existing infrastructure can use methods that reduce the power grid’s dependence on distance (ef-
fectively lowering α), such as using towers to raise long-distance transmission lines above trees.
Distributed generation may be a cost-effective alternative.
Of course, the metrics used here are not all-encompassing for quantifying robustness. Addi-
tional measures may be used that go beyond the topological connectivity of networks to network
functionality and dynamics, including problem-specific analyses [37, 38]. One specific example:
it is worth understanding how a spatial network’s travel distance may change following link fail-
ures, even when a giant component remains. It is also worth further characterizing fluctuations in,
e.g., qc that are due to the small size of these micronetworks.
Additional future work may include considering the unit square to have differential terrain,
changing the cost of edge placement over a continuous gradient. Also, applying the existing
model to real infrastructure network data, we may measure robustness of critical networks and
have better insight on how to design and improve these structures. Furthermore, in a real power
grid nodes do not all have equal roles and thus investigating not only spatially-dependent edge
failure but variations in node importance may gain more insight into spatial network robustness.
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Appendix A: Constructing optimized networks
Networks are initialized by first placing N = 50 nodes uniformly at random inside the unit
square. Initially the network is empty. The minimum spanning tree (MST) is inserted between
these nodes using Kruskal’s algorithm [39] with link weights corresponding to deff , and the con-
struction cost and travel distance are computed. The spanning tree, which may be modified as
optimization progresses, ensures the travel distance is finite when optimization begins. We find
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solutions to the constrained optimization problem (Eq. (1)) using simulated annealing (SA). At the
beginning of each SA step, an edge is added to the network at random and construction cost and
travel distance are recomputed. If the budget constraint is still satisfied with the addition of this
edge, the edge is kept using Boltzmann’s criterion: the edge is retained if it lowers the travel dis-
tance; if it does not lower the travel distance it is retained with probability e−β∆E, where ∆E is the
change in travel distance due to this change in the network, and β acts as the inverse temperature.
If the random edge puts the network over budget, we remove it and do one of two modifications.
With probability one half an existing edge is moved by placing it at random in the network where
no edge exists. Otherwise, a rewire is chosen. Edges are rewired by first selecting an existing edge
at random, next selecting either of the nodes connected by that edge, and finally attaching that end
of the edge from the chosen node to a node that is a non-neighbor. In other words, edge (i, j) is
removed and edge (i, k) is inserted where k , j and k was not previously a neighbor of i. The
move/rewire perturbation is then kept using the same Boltzmann’s criterion.
The cooling schedule starts at β0 = 100/(cost of MST), and cooled subsequently as βt+1 =
βt
(
1 + 3 × 10−5
)
. At each SA step we check if the current network topology is the best seen to
that point; the most optimal network found during any of the 3× 105 total SA steps is taken as our
solution.
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